Even today I've read opinions that the Schweinfurt raids on the ball bearing factories were a not worth it, as in cost to effect, and therefore those raids in particular were a mistake in command. What do you think?
shareNot worth it. Brave attempt, though. But hindsight is 20/20. As I recall, the plan was to try and bring German production to halt with one massive raid, but the Germans had already dispersed much of it. It took the Eighth many months to recover the losses, especially in men. They lost something like 60 bombers -- 600 crew -- in one mission. Wow!!
The resources would have been better spent on tactical targets in preparation for D-Day, in my opinion.
Good topic, though. Schweinfurt almost brought an end to "daylight precision bombing."
Good intentions, but bad intel on the German supply of ball bearings (they had more than enough already). The underlying premise for the whole campaign was to take away Germany's ability to make war by hitting their armaments industry. Seeing as there weren't enough bombers to hit it all at once, they targetted what they thought to be vital parts of it. Sometimes they were wrong. The Schweinfurt raid is a perfect example of this. Sometimes they targeted the right things, such as the Ploesti raids, or the numerous attakcs on German transportation networks. I think Schweinfurt and many other failues were more a failure of intelligence than a failure in command.
share[deleted]
Ploesti (Tidal Wave) not worth it. The place was back in full production in a week at a huge loss to the AAF.
shareWhere the raids worth it? I suppose if one asks the loved ones of the men lost, probably not. If one anylizes the bomb damage data, maybe not.
After the initial raid(s),(in Schweifurt and other locals), in 43' it was learned that the idea of tight formations of heavily armed bombers by themselves were not enough of a defense against fighter aircraft.
Let's keep in mind the American concept of daylight precision bombing of strategic targets was just that, a concept.
It easy to say in hindsight if this mission or that raid was worth it. Most of us are aware that the daylight,"Precision", raids prompted the germans to disperse thier manufacturing assets, making it virtually impossible to eliminate them. Schweinfurt was amoung the first of the raids to teach the germans this lesson.
Imagine if these raids, and that bombing campaign, was never carried out. Leaving the enemy completely free to carry on un-interrupted manufacture.
Yes, these raids did not destroy the germans manufacturing efforts, but it did cause a delay in production, however brief. The raids also caused more resources to be consumed in defense of the widely distributed facilities. And also in the transport of raw materials to the dispersed places, more trucks and trains were needed, consuming even more resources in this effort. In short, more gas and coal was guzzled, more anti-aircraft guns,(and thier crews), were posted to defend the industries of germany which meant that less resources and assets could be committed to the frontline.
It is the quantative data that I try to illuminate. Not to mention the psychological effect on the leadership and workers, in essence, the,"Big Picture".
My opinion is yes, the Schweinfurt raids were indeed worth it.
My heart and soul goes out to those who payed the high price in delivering, and recieving, these lessons in strategic bombing.
It wasn't until the 8th AF Bomber forces had gotten both the escorts to keep the fighters off of them AND they had the strength to fly multiple targets on a daily basis & make good their losses that they could REALLY strike heavy blows against German industry...according to this new book that I read, the REAL chokepoint targets were: Oil & Hydrogenation plants, Train & rail concentrations that transported soft coal to power German industry & Electricity Generation plants;
But....these targets had to be hit REPEATEDLY and OFTEN---it was a battle between the Bombers and the repair teams that tried to keep these facilities functioning; In the end, damage inflicted was too great & the raids too frequent for the repair teams to keep up with...
NickM
Albert Speer stated after the war the the one thing that really worrried him other than oil was ball bearings. IF the the 8th Air Force had been able to return to Schweinfurt quickly and deliver a crippling blow, German industry would have been brought to a halt. But after Bloody Thursday and the 1st Regensberg/Schweinfurt raid, it was just not going to happen.
Great shots of the Scheweinfurt area before and after the raids http://www.thirdreichruins.com/schweinfurt.htm
No matter where you go, there you are!
The way the campaign was carried out versus the results given, no, probably a waste of men and machines. As pointed out elsewhere in this thread, the ball bearing factories were not a panacea target at that point in the war, and a concerted campaign would have definitely hurt Germany. The mission violated the principles of concentration of forces and maintaining the element surprise--in hindsight the 8th should have left Regensburg for another day and concentrated everything at Schweinfurt. The result would have been bloody, but not as catastrophic as hitting two targets hours apart with sufficient time for the German fighters to re-arm and re-fuel, and mass along the route (the original plan to split the defenses had failed due to fog). An immediate followup raid should also have been conducted, even though it likely would have incurred massive losses, because it would have precluded the October 14 raid.
As it was, Speer had to procure ball bearings from the Swedes in order to keep manufacturing going. A concentrated campaign would likely have achieved its goals--the Nazis were vulnerable. By the time the 8th got strong enough to return to Schweinfurt in February 1944, the ball bearing industry had been successfully dispersed.
The raids, even the parts that were successful, did not slow the German war machine much. For another success/failure see "The Dam Busters'. The British tried to take out three dams that were supplying the industrial Ruhr valley with power. They got two out of three with very brave men and suffered bad losses but the damage was repaired very quickly so the attack, though partly successful, failed to achieve what was hoped for the mission. The movie shows a LOT of ingenuity on the part of the Brits and would be interesting (at least to a guy like me) even without the attack climax.
shareGuys: IIRC, the 8th actually destroyed a Konserven Fabrik,(Along with the Bearing Plants as well..) that made apricot preserves or something like that. The Germans spent some time trying to figure out why, which in its way contributed to the war effort. The main error was, according to the after action reports, the lack of incindiery bombs. If the 8th had dropped them with the HE bombs, the wooden floors, oil soaked, would have burned better than they did. I think even the Germans realized this...In any case the Germans got the factories running again very quickly, becuse they did not burn completely..
Dale
"If those sweethearts won't face German bullets--They'll face french ones!"
My opinion is that the strategic bombing would have been a success had the command been able to concentrate on one or at most two industries, such as bearings & oil, or transportation and aircraft. As it was, everybody had a pet target and the effort was spread too thin. NO industry was totally disrupted. If 8th AF had repeatedly and exclusively taken out oil targets i think it would have been decisive. After '44 Me 162s couldn't be used effectly due to lack of fuel. Imagine if there had been NO fuel. For tanks, planes, trains, ect.
The 8th's campaign was successful when it's strength grew to the point that it could hit several 'chokepoint' type targets on consistent & repeated basis without regard to losses--the repeated point is important because they have to damage it faster than repair crews can fix it;
By chokepoint, I mean, Oil, Transportation, power-the latter two are particularly linked to each other--transports(rail/canal/road) had to transport coal to generate power for the factories; those three targets together were REAL panacea targets.
NM
Exactly. Who ever was picking the targets, lacked the single-minded determination to totally eviserate ONE of several type targets. They kept letting themselves get distracted by various "crises" put forth by commanders who didn't understand the concepts of strategic bombing. What the 8th lacked was a Curtis Lemay.
"Even today I've read opinions that the Schweinfurt raids on the ball bearing factories were a not worth it, as in cost to effect, and therefore those raids in particular were a mistake in command. What do you think?"
.
"Toto, I've [got] a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
Of course it was huge mistake by some over ambitious officer. Welcome to politics, career building, cronyism, and a few dozen more human foibles. Military units, corporations, governments often pay for their mistakes with human lives, what's the big surprise?
shareDo you have any evidence of this?
Someone had to make some decisions about what targets were to be hit and when. Plans were all agreed upon and examined by relevant people, many of whom knew exactly what they were talking about.
What's your (realistic please) alternative?
You know it's tough to hear about a 'failed' mission when so many brave men fell in battle and ostensibly you can't see any measure of effectiveness. Lt Colonel Bernie Lay Jr noted that, " After we had been under constant attack for an hour it appeared that our group was faced with annihilation'. ....I doubt if a man in the group visualized the possibility of our getting much further without a one hundred percent loss". Of course, we're hearing about the bloodiest air battle at the time. But it stands to reason that raid did indeed put the Luftwaffe and Germany itself back on its heels in that psychologically they knew the Allies were making the statement of knocking on Germany's door and that nothing short of victory was going to be the object. I believe Schweinfurt was the farthest penetration bombers made into German air space at the time and it made the Luftwaffe pay extraordinary attention to their backyard. A demonstration like that had to be worth spades in pressing the war particularly in the way they chose to do it...daytime bombing of Germany's cities and factories. Schweinfurt perhaps 'failed' but nevertheless Germany did succumb to relentless Allied bombing attacks and they never could deal with it especially when the Goering's Luftwaffe collapsed and offered no mprotection against Allied air assaults.
shareUnfortunately, it's also worth remembering that the raid suffered in part from the vagueries of British and European weather. This was the reason why the second wave of bombers was caught; the Luftwaffe should have been on the ground refuelling but the 10 or 15 minute delay cost the USAAF dearly.
Interesting that nobody has mentioned Spaatz and the Oil Plan. Someone did mention Ploesti, which was the costliest raid of the war (in terms of percentage losses) for the Americans but also probably the most important.
Was Schweinfurt worth it? I think most would agree that it had to be attempted but given the cost/benefit ratio, there may have been other targets more worthy of the effort.
Yes, from the looks of it in hindsight. Not being there when those kinds of life/death decisions makes it hard I think to understand in our armchairs how decisions are arrived at in theaters of war. You know if you take the calculus of every event the Al;lies took in defeating Hitler, you'd have to come to the conclusion that all in all everything was worth it..but some events are more the downpayment towards the absolute successes. War is sure a dirty enterprise.
shareOne benefit was that if they did not destroy the factories or refineries- they killed off the Germans best pilots and shot down their planes faster then they could be replaced.
shareNot worth it. Actually the entire strategic bombing effort in Europe arguably wasn't worth it; the effort and manpower would've been better spent on more riflemen for the chronically under strength American infantry divisions. Of course the tactical air force was very useful in the actual business of killing German soldiers and helping to move the infantry along.
Obviously the strategic air force was essential in the war against the Japanese, what with the Bomb.
I agree with the strategic aspect of the bombing not being worth it. How would you assess the psychological impact on the allies (military and civilian) of knowing that we were hitting the enemy deep in their own country at a time when we were unable to invade with ground troops?
share