Would the stats show conclusively that being in a bomber put one among the highest casualty rates of any armed service during WWII? If not #1, I think it certainly has to be up there. The odds were tough in an airman coming back alive after a run.
The following is based on years of general reading, so I can't quote a specific source. I believe that the submarine forces had the highest overall casualty rate, US forces suffering close to 50%. Japan had 95% or so, and Germany not far behind. US bomber losses I think were in the 25% area, but remember that this is the whole war. The loss rate was not constant, and improved steadily after D Day. By 1945 the loss rate was fairly low. In contrast, remember that the Memphis Belle was the first crew to complete 25 missions, late in 1943, after we had been at war for nearly two years. So for that first 18 to 20 months no crew survived long enough to complete 25 missions. Robert Morgan, the Belle's pilot is quoted at 80% losses for his bomb group (91st bg, 324 Squadron) in three months. Please take none of this as 100% accurate, but it should be in the ball park. Lots of things to remember, the axis was at war longer the the US, tactics changed, radar was developed, fighter cover improved, etc, etc. '42 and '45 were worlds apart in terms of the war.
It was not the whole crew of the Memphis Belle that completed the 25 missions, just the plane and a few of the crew. The rest still had many more missions to go since they mixed and matched crew all the time so it was relatively rare to have the same crew at the end that you started with
lwi101..thanks for those stats.....You know when I looked at that 80% casualty figure for the group you mentioned I'd wonder if that happened in the army as well. Now would an army commander put his forces in that kind of a situation attacking a target knowing that his group is operating under that kind of rate? I don't know. Would that be considered a "suicide" mission? An 80% rate means that 8 out 10 go going up nd never come down. If you were one of the groups getting ready to go up is it any wonder mechanical failure or feeling sickness came to affect the flights???
I came across some other interesting stats while researching something else entirely. Apparently the AAF had the highest overall casualty rate, which was 7 and a fraction percent. The next highest in the Marines in the 3 and a fraction area. Remember, this includes all personnel, admin and ground staff, some of whom were stationed in the US. In Viet Nam, the ratio of non combatants to combat troops was about 10 to 1. No matter how you cut it, the Air Force took a beating. Regarding Army units, a company was considered "demoralized" and no longer combat effective if it took higher than 25% losses in one battle. This is discussed in "Band of Brothers", as some of the airborn units took such high losses, but were kept in combat. The Air Force stats are a bit different. On the Ploesti raid, the 600 planes came from several groups and Squadrons, so no one group took a 10 % hit on one day. The entire squadron was rarely or never assigned to one mission, so while the Squadron flew every day, the same pilots did not. Also within the crews, the pilots and copilots had a higher loss rate, The usual procedure was for the pilots to hold the plane steady so the rest of the crew could bail out. Often they couldn't get out themselves. Also the German tactic was to dive at the front of the Forts, and target the flight deck. This is the origin of the "12 O'Clock High" call. Forts were so hard to shoot down, the Luftwaffe found it easier to kill the pilots. When you look at it no one in combat had an easy time. Try and read "With the Old Breed.." by Sledge, his story of the Marines in the Pacific. It will turn your stomach. Say thank you to any Vet you meet! L
According to the historian, Williamson Murray, being in a bomber over Germany, was statistically the single most dangerous place for an ALLIED serviceman in WWII...That included the AAF & the RAF...If you were on the Axis side However.......well you didn't wanna be in a Uboat, at Stalingrad or on a Pacific Island....Kamikazes had a really high death rate....
I also read that you didn't want to be in a Stuka after you get out of your dive....you become easy pickin's for fighters just barreling on you while you slow up to get out of the dive...
That doesn't make any sense. Dive bombers actually stabilize to a bombing speed using dive brakes and power settings; it's actually SLOWER that full out top speed to give them more accuracy and to make sure they don't overstress the airframe.
After the bomb attack, dive bombers actually SPEED UP as they retract the dive brakes, increase power and get out of the target area. If you are in a fighter, expecting a dive bomber to SLOW DOWN, you've got a big surprise coming!
Check out your next wacky rumor with an actual pilot.
Ground attack pilots and crews (including dive bombers) attained one of the highest casualty rates among types of aircraft used in World War II regardless of nationality or side of the conflict.
After World War II, dive bombing became completely obsolete in peace-time and war.
"Toto, I've [got] a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
Remember, the term casualty doesn't mean KIA. Those that are wounded also fall under the term casualty. So it's possible that a unit would have a more than 100% casualty rate.
This will be the high point of my day; it's all downhill from here.
US subs? We didn't lose that many subs in WW2; maybe you mean U-Boat crews? Something like 90% of all U-Boat sailors were KIA/MIA during the war--something like 30 thousand++;
From an American force perspective submarine duty had the highest casulity rate for US servicemen. They made up 1% of the Navy. They had 300 subs by wars close and lost 52 of them to ememy action or mishap.
Yep -- last service of any type or country that I would have wanted to be in during WWII would have been the one for U-boats (excepting whatever the Japanese called the cadre of kamikaze pilots).
Re reading my earlier post, I may have given an incorrect perception. I do not believe that bomber crews had the highest loss rate in the US service. It is true that submarines had the highest overall rate. The Bombers in Europe had a very tough start.Early on the loss rate was extremely high, on the order of 80%. As the war progressed, particularly after April 1944, the loss rate dropped dramatically, due to several factors, but mainly due to long range fighters. This is not to imply that 1945 was easy. The over all loss rate for bombers is around 28%, but was much much higher in the early years. Remember it was August 1943 before the Memphis Belle came home. At war for 2.5 years before the Air Corps felt comfortable talking about crews FINISHING 25 missions. I don't know for sure, but I believe the loss rate for subs was higher in the early years of the war. I think I was trying to say that having a low loss rate did not equate to an easy time! L
It is overwhelming (and in my opinion, hard to fathom and almost inconceivable) to grasp the amount of information regarding the statistics, contributions and losses of Heavy Bombers (B-17s and B-24s) in Europe during the Second World War.
I have compiled random facts about the "Heavies" in Europe and compared (in certain cases) to other theater of operations, including against Japan.
Total...............................10,977.......4,152 (*Does not include non-combat loses: mechanical failures, aircraft collisions, pilot/crew member error, and training accidents.)
10 Heaviest Combat Mission Losses by B-17s and B-24s in Europe
Date: 1 August 1943 Mission Number: N/A Targets: Polesti Total Dispatched: 179 Aborted: 2 Crossed Coast: 175 Lost en Route: 1 Bombed: 174 Total Lost: 55 Damaged: N/A Loss Rate: 31.43%
(*Highest loss rate mission in Europe.)
Date: 17 August 1943 Mission Number: 84 Targets: Schweinfurt and Regensburg Total Dispatched: 376 Aborted: 26 Crossed Coast: 350 Lost en Route: 35 Bombed: 315 Total Lost: 60 Damaged: 168 Loss Rate: 17.14%
(*Triple tie for most bombers lost in a single day: 60)
Date: 6 September 1943 Mission Number: 91 Targets: Stuggart and Diversion Total Dispatched: 407 Aborted: 47 Crossed Coast: 360 Lost en Route: 38 Bombed: 322 Total Lost: 45 Damaged: 116 Loss Rate: 12.50%
Date: 4 October 1943 Mission Number: 108 Targets: Weisbaden, Frankfurt, Saarlautern, Sarreguemnines, Diversion Total Dispatched: 361 Aborted: 37 Crossed Coast: 324 Lost en Route: 0 Bombed: 324 Total Lost: 16 Damaged: 120 Loss Rate: 4.94%
Date: 8 October 1943 Mission Number: 111 Targets: Bremen and Vegesack Total Dispatched: 399 Aborted: 42 Crossed Coast: 357 Lost en Route: 0 Bombed: 357 Total Lost: 30 Damaged: 236 Loss Rate: 8.40%
Date: 9 October 1943 Mission Number: 113 Targets: Anklam, Marienburg, Gydnia Total Dispatched: 327 Aborted: 16 Crossed Coast: 311 Lost en Route: 0 Bombed: 311 Total Lost: 26 Damaged: 126 Loss Rate: 8.36%
Date: 10 October 1943 Mission Number: 114 Targets: Munster Total Dispatched: 274 Aborted: 38 Crossed Coast: 236 Lost en Route: 0 Bombed: 236 Total Lost: 30 Damaged: 126 Loss Rate: 12.71%
Date: 14 October 1943 Mission Number: 115 Targets: Schweinfurt Total Dispatched: 351 Aborted: 68 Crossed Coast: 254 Lost en Route: 32 Bombed: 222 Total Lost: 60 Damaged: 138 Loss Rate: 23.62%
(*Highest loss rate over Germany.)
(*Triple tie for most aircraft lost in a single day: 60)
Date: 11 January 1944 Mission Number: 182 Targets: Oschersleben, Halberstadt, Brunswick Total Dispatched: 663 Aborted: 70 Crossed Coast: 593 Lost en Route: 2 Bombed: 551 Total Lost: 60 Damaged: 179 Loss Rate: 10.12%
(*Triple tie for most aircraft lost in a single day: 60)
Date: 6 March 1944 Mission Number: 250 Targets: Berlin Total Dispatched: 730 Aborted: N/A Crossed Coast: N/A Lost en Route: N/A Bombed: 672 Total Lost: 51 Damaged: 175 Loss Rate: 6.99%
(*No data for bombers: aborted, crossed coast, lost en route or bombed.)
U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) in European, North Africa and Mediterranean Theater of Operation, 1942-1946 (Derived from the Department of the Army "Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II - Final Report" [Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Army, GPO, 1 June 1953] pp. 84-88)
==Killed in Action==
ETO............................23,805 North Africa and MTO....9,997
Total KIA...................33,802
==Wounded and Injured in Action (Died of Wounds)==
ETO............................9,299 (510) North Africa and MTO....4,428 (276)
Total Wounded..........13,727 (786)
==Captured and Interned (POWs Dying in Captivity)==
ETO*..........................26,064 (148) North Africa and MTO....7,350 (54)
Total Captured...........33,414 (202)
==Missing in Action (Returned to Duty)==
ETO............................2,853 (2,316) North Africa and MTO....3,642 (3,125)
Total MIA...................6,495 (5,441)
Total Casualties (ETO)......................................................62,021 Total Casualties (North Africa) and MTO...........................25,417 Total AAF (all theaters KIA)..............................................44,785 Total AAF (all theaters) wounded or injured in Action......18,364 Died in Captivity...............................................................1,004 Total AAF (all theaters) Captured and Interned...............41,057 Died in Captivity...............................................................2,783 Total AAF (all theaters) MIA.............................................11,176 Returned to Duty..............................................................7,556
Total AAF (all theaters) Casualties....................................115,382
Total AAF Aircraft Accident Deaths....................................25,844 (7 December 1941 - 31 December 1946)
(*This figure includes all AAF prisoners recovered from POW camps in Germany. It would, therefore, count a great many aircrews captured by the Axis in North Africa and the Mediterranean (belonging to the Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth Air Forces) and thus transferred to Germany.)
31 March 1944 - Peaked 2,411,294 men and women serving in the United States Army Air Force
30 April 1945 - Peaked 1,224,006 serving overseas
8 May 1945 - Peaked 911 airfields
*115,382 casualties out of 2,411,294 service members is 4.79% of casualties (killed-in-action, deaths, wounds, injuries, missing-in-action and prisoner of war), not as high as some have reported on this topic.
"Toto, I've [got] a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
Great post! The 2,411,294 serving in the AAF includes stateside personnel as well as ETO ground and administrative personnel. I was referring to bomber combat crew losses or the percent of combat crews who were lost. Obviously the number of crews lost will be a smaller percentage of the entire air force vs the percentage of combat crews. In Viet Nam it took 9 non combatants to field 1 combat soldier. I do not know the equivalent number for WWII. In addition, the number of combat crews escalated dramatically as the war progressed. March of 1944 was the turning point, and by April 1944 the number of missions was raised to 30 and then 35 to reflect the change in mortality rates.
March of 1944 was the turning point, and by April 1944 the number of missions was raised to 30 and then 35 to reflect the change in mortality rates.
The change in mortality rates in March-April 1944 in turn reflects the arrival of the Merlin-engined P-51 Mustangs in theater (the B & C models, soon to be followed by the even more improved D & K models with 360-degree-vision canopies and additional firepower), allowing for fighter escort all the way to the targets and back. March 4, 1944 marked the first USAAF (and the first ever daylight, fighter-escorted) raid on Berlin, after which Hermann Goering later admitted that when the Mustangs appeared over the city, he knew the war was lost.
I don't have the exact statistical table in front of me, but the figures I recall are that the USAAF bomber loss rates with P-51 escorts fell to one fourth of what they had been without the P-51s. In the period between the second Schweinfurt raid in October 1943 and the first P-51 escort missions (actually in December 1943), the B-17 and B-24 were considered endangered species, and the 8th Air Force was seriously considering discontinuing precision daylight bombing and joining the RAF Bomber Command in night area bombing.
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In WWII my Uncle was a bomber pilot and my Dad ground crew. The Uncle never came home while my Dad did. So in my family heavy bombers have a 50% mortality rate.
Guys: For some reason, unknown to me, in spite of the Mustangs, the 100th Bomb Group still took a lot of losses, so much so that it was called "The Bloody Hundred" by the 8th AF personnel. I have never seen any expalanation for this particular run of bad luck...
Dale
"If those sweethearts won't face German bullets--They'll face French ones!"
One story I read (I believe it was in the book Airwar by Edward Jablonski, but I'm not 100% on that) was that during one incident, a 100th BG B-17 sustained hydraulic damage that caused its landing gear to drop. Intentionally lowering one's landing gear is the international aviation equivalent of running up a white flag, a signal for "Don't shoot! I surrender!" As the B-17 fell out of formation, a flight of German fighters approached it from the rear, expecting to escort it to their home base. Apparently the gunners on the B-17 were unaware of the situation with the landing gear and opened fire on the Germans, shooting one down. The remainder of the German flight quickly blew away the B-17 and returned to base and reported the incident, whereupon the Luftwaffe fighter command, interpreting the incident as an act of treachery, marked the 100th BG for annihilation, hence its high casualty rate.
And of course, Tom the story of the 'Bloody Hundredth' being singled out is just a myth; it's problem was it's officers tended to run a very loose ship (kind of like Keith Davenport-popular but lenient) and that included not too great formation keeping. The Jagdwaffe had no way to know what bomb group was what, but they were VERY quick to take advantage of a group/division that kept poor formation or strayed out too far from it's escorts or out of position with the rest of the 'box';
Nickm2: Thanks, I always thought the war story about the landing gear was just another WW 2 Military Myth, that is why I did not mention it...The story has a number of obvious defects....Like the Germans having a close pass to ID the Bomb Group, and the crew not noticing the gear was down--drop in airspeed, etc..
Dale
"If those sweethearts won't face German bullets--They'll face French ones!"
The story has a number of obvious defects....Like the Germans having a close pass to ID the Bomb Group, and the crew not noticing the gear was down--drop in airspeed, etc..
I'm not arguing either for or against the veracity of the story, but with regard to those "obvious defects":
1. The gear being down implies that the German fighters should have been able to move close enough to the B-17 to identify the unit markings without expecting to be fired upon. (It's somewhat analogous to the way Audie Murphy's best friend Lattie Tipton was killed by German machine gunners who raised their hands to lure Tipton and Murphy out from behind their cover. I don't know how familiar you are with the ground war in France, but if you know the story of Audie Murphy, you know what happened to that whole German platoon!)
2. In a shot-up bomber, any kind of chaos can ensue: lowered landing gear could be just one of many kinds of battle damage that could cause drag, noise and loss of airspeed (and there are no airspeed indicators at any of the gunner's stations) and the intercom may have been out. Or the aircraft commander may have just ordered the gunners to keep shooting. It's entirely possible that the gunners were never briefed or forgot that lowering the gear was a surrender signal. Even in a perfectly functioning aircraft, the fog of war can get thick pretty fast.
Many if not most myths have a kernel of truth within them. The best example I like to give is how at the end of the Civil War, when Union troops surrounded the house where Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his wife were hiding, the two of them grabbed and put on each other's cloaks as they tried to flee. That incident was the kernel that resulted in the myth that Davis was captured in drag. While the Luftwaffe marking the "Bloody 100th" for extermination may not have been the actual cause for its high loss rate, I wouldn't discard the reported incident altogether.
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Tom: I was thinking of my Dad's old war buddies and they way they invented this sort of stuff...It was not aimed at you, sorry!!
When I was a kid in the AF, I heard this story more than once, and I wondered how the Nazis knew which group was which-without a close pass, and if they make a pass, they will get shot at, so why bother? Of course it is possible that some of the eagle eyed pilots could remember and spot a particular unit's markings..
I still wonder if the "Save a Bomb for Mainz" story about the 8th AF and that German city is true???
When I was in the US Army as an Aviator, I asked the WW 2 Luftwaffe Vets in Germany about this...Their majority opinion was, why bother? Just shoot the easy targets and return alive...
I caught a bunch of WW 2 vets in my time in the Army,and later when I worked in Aerospace, Rudy Opitz, the Me-163 Test pilot among others...Most of them were happy to still be alive after WW 2!!
Dale
"If those sweethearts won't face German bullets--They'll face French ones!"
During Feb 44 the 8th started concentrating of aviation industry targets, factories and airfields, I think to gain air superiority for D Day (June 44). Starting in late Feb 44 and there were P-38's, P-47 and P 51 long range escorts. The P 51 became prominent, but all three types contributed. March 44 was also the first "Deep Penetration" raids, The bombing of Berlin, and the introduction if Unpainted, bare metal, air craft, all things that pointed to a turning tide. originally, the bare metal planes seemed to attract more attention from enemy fighters, but by April-May, they were more numerous and the OD planes really stand out, at least it seems from the diaries I've read.
It's interesting to note that 8 out of the top 10 deadliest raids over Europe happened in 1943. You couldn't pay me enough to have been part of VIII Bomber Command during that time period. I had an opportunity to talk to my girlfriend's grandfather who was a pilot, arriving in 1943 in England. I asked him how many milk runs he piloted.
He replied with: "There were none."
That put things into perspective for me more than all the books I've read about the American air strategy and campaign in Europe.
"Toto, I've [got] a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
August of '43 wasn't 2.5 years into the war for the US, as it was little more than 1.5 years from the time of Pearl Harbor. And the US didn't see action in Europe until July of '42, when the US 8th AF borrowed six planes for a mission in which only three returned. But yes, the beginning of the US air campaign was the most dangerous. The Luftwaffe was still a major player in '42 through '43. The Allies didn't control the air until '44.
This will be the high point of my day; it's all downhill from here.
The 8th Air Force was called VIII Bomber Command for most of the war, this is a huge misconception when discussing the organization that lead most of the bombing raids into Europe during World War II.
~350,000 personnel served ~200,000 personnel at the height of organization mid-1944 ~26,000+ died (includes KIA, wounded and later died, died in POW camps, non-combatant deaths.)
(Note: There is no exact data regarding the total number of personnel who served, the height of personnel in the organization and total deaths in VIII Bomber Command/Eighth Air Force.)
US Marine Corps
669,100 personnel served 24,511 died 19,733 combatant deaths 4,778 non-combatant deaths 68,207 wounded
Both organizations contributed to the war effort and there's no doubt that the cost of life was severe, it's unfair to deny the contributions of the Marine Corps when comparing how many were killed. Although the comparison between the VIII Bomber Command/Eighth Air Force is accurate, it's a small-minded way of examining the sacrifices made during World War II.
"Toto, I've [got] a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
Tiki, one must remember the large numbers of VIII bomber command aircrew who ended up as POWs as well as those who were wounded & returned home---that's the only thing that would make their situation different from the USMC's.
RAF Bomber Command had appalling casualty rates too. According to Max Hastings' book "Bomber Command", 44.7% were killed and only 27% completed their tour of 30 missions (a USAAF tour was 25 missions).
Of the 125,000 British and Commonwealth aircrew, 55,300 died.
Look at the title of this thread. Where does it say I have to use your terms of reference?
As it happens, RAF Bomber Command had the second highest casualty rates of the European theatre, after the U-Boat crews. Seems to fit with the spirit of the thread quite well I'd say.