MovieChat Forums > Twelve O'Clock High (1950) Discussion > Hasn't U S daylight bombing in Europe be...

Hasn't U S daylight bombing in Europe been viewed a costly failure?

posted 10 years ago by phlbrq58
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I've been reading some histories and viewing docs and believe many claim now a consensus view that the strategy portrayed in TOH was an arrogant, ill conceived plan of attack that was drastically modified in 1943. The RAF got to say told you so and even further the bombing of war making industry was a bust too.

So the pilots who wanted to bail were well justified and Peck was enforcing a very flawed, costly plan that in hindsight, yea,yea, was a wasteful,mistake.

[–] kbarada 10 years ago

Recently, on another thread regarding the Schweinfurt raids, I made this comment:

I agree with the strategic aspect of the bombing not being worth it. How would you assess the psychological impact on the allies (military and civilian) of knowing that we were hitting the enemy deep in their own country at a time when we were unable to invade with ground troops?

I also wonder about the psychological impact on the German military and civilian population that their highly vaunted "Fortress Europe" wasn't as impregnable as they once believed. Any thoughts?

[–] phlbrq58 10 years ago

The RAF tried daylight bombing and switched to night raids and advised the U S to do the same. We eventually took the advise. So it's not whether but HOW to bomb Germany. Reasons for daylight raids were accuracy and minimizing civilian damage. By 45 U.S. destroys Dresden for no direct military purpose but to appease Russia.
There are many mistakes in war. The TOH pilots are opposing a policy we now recognize as flawed but in 1950 it's still the leadership that knows best. Imagine these piloets encountering RAF crew at a bar and learning their experience. Your units getting shot to hell for limited success and there's a less costly path.
I'm a history,WWII fan. This was a very dramatic situation early in U S 'prosecution' of the European war. It's fascinating that the book,movie and series come down on the side of,"You soldiers have to be more disciplined and loyal to the whole squad. Sure it's a dirty job but when you do it right this wars going to be over sooner." Maybe today we can say that was wrongheaded b.s..

[–] MadTom 10 years ago

HUH???

The RAF tried daylight bombing and switched to night raids and advised the U S to do the same. We eventually took the advise.

When in the European Theater did that happen? The USAAF considered that option, and was still considering it when the Merlin-engined P-51 Mustang arrived in theater with enough range to escort the bombers all the way to the targets across Germany. The USAAF may have backed off a little between the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raids and the arrival of the Merlin-engined P-51, but they never switched to night bombing. (What happened in the bombing campaign on the Japanese mainland is a different story with different issues.)

By 45 U.S. destroys Dresden for no direct military purpose but to appease Russia. There are many mistakes in war.

The bombing of the populated areas of Dresden was a night raid by the RAF. The USAAF bombed the railroad marshaling yards and junction on the outskirts of town the next morning, which was a critical and legitimate military target regarding German logistics for the Russian Front. And there were German war-related industries in the city itself. I recommend the book Dresden by Frederick Taylor, which dispels most of the myths originated and perpetuated by Kurt Vonnegut and communist propagandists.

[–] nickm2 10 years ago

most of the myths originated and perpetuated by Kurt Vonnegut and communist propagandists.

Well I always felt Dresden's location in East Germany had a lot to do with the 'controversy' surrounding the bombing.

Why can't you wretched prey creatures understand that the Universe doesn't owe you anything!?

[–] MrMime2015 10 years ago

About 20 years ago, read a book on the air war that gave daylight bombing more of a mixed review. In Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer claimed the German armament industry was as productive in late 44-early 45 as ever. If you can't believe an ex-Nazi, who can you believe?

[–] ojleslie 9 years ago

Speer was right about this.
The Germans did produce more aircraft in 1944 than in earlier years, around 44,000 or so.
What's amazing about this is they managed to do this with scattered, camouflaged and buried underground factories.

Here's the thing though. If their infrastructure and industry had not been damaged to the extent they were the production figures could only have been higher.
Germany also might have been able to bring larger numbers of advanced aircraft into the war earlier than they did.

And I'm only talking about the aircraft industries here.

The bomber campaign didn't end the war in the ETO, not like it did in Japan, but Speer's ministry was besieged by difficulties in production nonetheless.

[–] nickm2 9 years ago

The decentralization (and ample supplies of slave labor) sure helped but there was nothing that could about the combined bomber offensive from blowing the crap out of those precious oil refineries & coal hydrogenation plants---and from also wrecking transportation & power generating facilities.

Ultimately it don't matter how many planes you got if you ain't got fuel (or capable pilots) to fly them.

Why can't you wretched prey creatures understand that the Universe doesn't owe you anything!?

[–] MrPrimitiveBoomstick 10 years ago

Unless you're a nazi propagandist, it was a complete success. Fighting a determined enemy won't deliver easy victories. This was true in not only the daylight raids by our airmen in Europe but also our island hopping marines in the pacific.

MrsPrimitiveBoomsticks bit of stuff

[–] 10 years ago

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[–] TD2112 9 years ago

The Strategic Bombing Campaign failed in its stated goal of destroying Germany's ability to wage war. As stated German war production actually increased in late '44,early '45. However it did succeed in its goal (after Doolittle took command of the 8th A/F) of drawing the Luftwaffe into the air and destroying it. Because of the 8th's A/F and Bomber Commands efforts the western allies achieved air supremacy which the Allied high command considered necessary before Normandy Landings could go forward. Then there are the effects that can't be quantified. The diversion of resources (i.e 88mm guns and their crews) from the eastern front to Germany. The shifting of most Fighter units from forward areas to Germany and various locations along the bomber routes to protect industry, the loss of experienced fighter pilots, the shift in aircraft production to almost exclusively fighters. etc. The list goes on.
The major error in my opinion wasn't the concept of strategic bombing itself, it was the execution. Specifically the failure to recognize early on that the belief that the B-17 and the B-24 could fight it's way deep into Germany without fighter escort was wrong. Of course this belief was reinforced by the crews themselves,who despite horrendous losses did manage to fight their way through to the target, no 8th AF mission ever turned back due to enemy action. They were turned back by the weather, by mechanical issues, but never by the Luftwaffe. Secondly it took to long to prioritize the bombing of oil production facilities. Once bombing oil facilities became the priority the 8th AF actually did have a real affect on Germany's ability to continue the war.
Late in the war Germany managed produced more aircraft and tanks then they ever had. But all those tanks are useless without fuel, and the planes are useless without pilots and fuel. Those shortages were a direct result of the strategic bombing campaign.
The question is was it worth the cost in young men? That is a question I can't answer. I don't think anyone can.

[–] JFox93 9 years ago

This essay about the film -

https://www.loc.gov/programs/static/national-film-preservation-board/documents/twelve_clock.pdf

- written by the Library of Congress, upon the film's 1998 induction into the National Film Registry, actually makes note of the controversy over daylight precision bombing. In fact, the essay suggests that the novel upon which the film is based first piqued 20th Century Fox's interest, in large part because it questioned the effectiveness of this strategy. I can't say just how much of this actually carried over into the film, but I do feel like there are moments, in which the matter can at least be inferred, even if it isn't dealt with in the most direct manner.

[–] TD2112 9 years ago

I haven't read the book unfortunately, in the movie there really is only one quick reference when the MOH winner Bishop said he wanted out because he lost confidence in what they were doing.

[–] poetcomic1 9 years ago

Precision daylight bombing or massive night raids the expert consensus now.... is that the allied air effort could have dropped 1% of the bombs they did with far greater devastation if it was all concentrated on destroying and redestroying GERMAN UTILITY plants. Makes a lot of sense.